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Abstract 
 
English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory 
regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance 
against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of 
performance metrics (such as the reported surplus and return on assets), and a 
‘prudential borrowing limit’, a measure of borrowing capacity. In this paper we 
investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary 
accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary 
accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the 
avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary 
accruals are more positive/negative when pre-managed performance is below/well 
above intervention triggering thresholds; third, that, despite a move away from financial 
breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small 
loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two 
metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) 
and the prudential borrowing limit, a measure of borrowing capacity. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past thirty years an ongoing programme of public sector reform 
throughout the OECD has resulted in the increased marketization of public services, 
the corporatisation of public sector entities, and the emulation of private sector ‘best 
practice’ including increased managerial freedom (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Such 
reforms are  widely referred to as New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991, 1995) 
and have been particularly pronounced in the area of healthcare, where public spending 
accounts for more than 7% of GDP for most of Europe, the British Commonwealth and 
the US1 (House of Commons 2011, p.4).  To protect both public money and services 
there has been a corresponding growth in risk-based regulation in which the extent of 
scrutiny and intervention into public service providers has been determined by their 
performance against a number of pre-determined performance metrics and in which an 
assessment of financial sustainability plays a key role (Black and Baldwin 2010). In 
this context, variations in financial reporting quality could serve to undermine both 
regulatory effectiveness and resource allocation across and between public services. In 
this paper, we investigate the variation of financial reporting quality with regulatory 
incentives when public entities are granted considerable managerial freedom and are 
subject to a risk based regulatory regime.  
Whilst agency theory predicts the management of financial performance to 
avoid regulatory intervention and to trigger rewards for good performance, theories of 
public service motivation offer an alternative framework in which we might not expect 
significant management of reported performance.  First, the primary objective of public 
sector organisations is service delivery rather than the generation of profit (International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards Board® (IPSASB®) 2014, p.4). Second, the 
incentive framework in the public sector is weak: the incidence of performance related 
pay is low and has a focus on service delivery rather than financial performance (The 
Work Foundation 2014). Third, information asymmetry between organisational 
managers and those monitoring and evaluating their performance is often low: 
                                                 
1 Total spending on healthcare in the US is more than twice that of other nations but approximately half 
is represented by public (federal) spending mainly on the Medicare and Medicaid programmes. 
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regulators and funding providers often have the power and resources to demand 
additional information which reduces the potential for disguising underlying 
performance. These factors arguably combine to create a culture which is inimical to 
the misleading of key stakeholders, such as regulators and the public, about the 
underlying financial performance of the entity. However, NPM-inspired reforms have 
undoubtedly strengthened the incentive framework and in this context there has been 
some concern, and evidence, that such reforms erode and ‘crowd out’ public service 
motivation and values (Georgellis et al. 2011, Jørgensen and Anderson 2011, Bellé 
2015). Further, with the widespread adoption of accruals accounting throughout the 
OECD public sector (Blöndal 2003), the incentives and opportunities for the 
management of reported financial performance have been increasing.  
In not for profit entities, for example, Jegers (2010) has analysed the 
manipulation of earnings and other financial indicators and shows that agency problems 
exacerbate earnings management with a potentially negative impact on welfare, an 
issue also raised in a study of performance measurement practices in the public sector 
by Cuganesan et al. (2014). They identify the tensions between the performance of 
individual accounting entities and broader system objectives with, for example,  ‘..an 
emphasis on local goal achievement at the expense of broader global objectives, and a 
focus on measured performance dimensions to the detriment of unmeasured ones such 
as system responsibility and important inter-organisational collaboration’ (p.281). Both 
Jegers (2010) and Cuganesan et al. (2014) call for additional research into performance 
measurement in the public sector with a view to exploring the risks associated with 
current practice. This paper represents a response to these calls.  
Our setting is English National Health Service Foundation Trusts. Foundation 
Trusts account for more than £30bn, (or roughly 30%), of UK annual public expenditure 
on healthcare 2 . They were established from 2004-05 and have been granted an 
unprecedented level of managerial freedom (Lapsley and Schofield 2009) including the 
ability to retain surpluses and to borrow commercially in order to fund their strategic 
development, over which they exercise a high degree of autonomy. Foundation Trusts 
are subject to regulation by an independent regulator, Monitor, (Health and Social Care 
                                                 
2  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140131031506/http:/www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/parlment/nolan/nolan.htm (accessed 27 November 2015) 
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(Community Health and Standards) Act 2003) which operates a risk-based regulatory 
regime3 (Monitor 2009b p.5). Poor performance against a number of financial metrics 
results in intervention in the form of additional monitoring and possible replacement of 
the Board and Governing Body (Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) Act 2003, s.23, National Health Service Act 2006, s.52) whilst good 
performance results in a reduction in the intensity of monitoring, and access to 
additional sources of funding. Regulatory action is triggered by performance against 
two key metrics: a ‘financial risk-rating’ 4 , which aims to measure financial 
sustainability, and which is an aggregate  measure of performance (comprising 
EBITDA margin, surplus margin, return on assets, liquidity and performance against 
plan) and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’ which is a measure of gearing and borrowing 
capacity. This regime thus introduces incentives for the avoidance of regulatory 
intervention and for the triggering of additional managerial autonomy.  
Prior literature has explored accruals management in public sector entities only 
in response to the financial breakeven benchmark and has found income increasing 
(decreasing) discretionary accruals when pre-managed performance is below (above) 
this benchmark and that public entities also manage discretionary accruals to avoid the 
reporting of small losses (Leone and Van Horn 2005, Ballantine et al. 2007). We 
contribute to this literature and to our understanding of financial reporting quality in 
the public sector by investigating the impact of a new form of public sector regulation. 
We use discretionary accruals as our proxy for financial reporting quality and, using 
data sourced from financial statements and the regulator’s reporting template, estimate 
a pre-managed risk rating and prudential borrowing limit. We find that: first, 
discretionary accruals are income increasing (decreasing) for pre-managed deficits 
(surpluses) indicating that financial performance is managed to report small surpluses; 
                                                 
3 A risk based regulatory regime is one in which the level of monitoring and of regulatory intervention 
is proportionate to the assessed risk to services and/or financial sustainability. Such regimes are being 
increasingly adopted as public money is increasingly devolved to service providers with increasing 
levels of managerial freedom, and in order to generate efficiency in regulatory costs by targeting 
regulatory attention where it is most needed. For a summary of the key features of a risk based 
regulatory regime, see Black and Baldwin 2010, pp. 183-185. The Foundation Trust regulatory regime 
exhibits these key features. 
4  ‘Financial risk rating’ is the regulator’s terminology and includes metrics which are related to 
operational performance (such as EBITDA and % of plan EBITDA achieved) as well as metrics 
related for example to liquidity. The term is used to distinguish it from service based non-financial 
metrics such as waiting times for treatment.  
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second, consistent with incentives to avoid regulatory intervention, discretionary 
accruals are significantly more positive when the pre-managed risk rating is just below 
the intervention triggering threshold and when the prudential borrowing limit is 
breached; third, consistent with incentives to protect future performance against cost 
and revenue pressures, and the possibility of future regulatory intervention, that they 
are significantly more negative when well above the risk ratings intervention threshold;  
fourth, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as a key objective, there 
remains an aversion to small loss reporting. When the financial risk rating is 
disaggregated we further find that the management of discretionary accruals is being 
driven by the income and expenditure surplus (deficit), a measure of retained earnings 
and a key performance metric for all stakeholders, and by the prudential borrowing 
limit, a breach of which would have implications for the strategic capacity of the Trust.  
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 considers prior literature; section 3 
gives further contextual information regarding the institutional setting; section 4 sets 
out our method, data and sampling; section 5 reports our findings and section 6 
concludes with a discussion and consideration of the implications of our findings.  
2 Prior literature  
Prior empirical studies in the not-for-profit and public sectors have focused on 
reported surpluses and show that, in response to the need to protect existing and future 
levels of funding and for the signalling of competence in the use of resources, entities 
manage earnings to report small surpluses close to zero demonstrating an aversion not 
only to the reporting of losses (consistent with the findings of the much more 
substantive private sector literature), but also to the reporting of large surpluses. 
Evidence of such management has been found in both public and not-for-profit 
hospitals (Hoerger 1991, Leone and Van Horn 2005, Ballantine et al. 2007) and in the 
not-for-profit sector more generally (Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012).  
Ballantine et al. (2008) in the UK, and Eldenburg et al. (2004) in the US also 
provide evidence of incentives to avoid the reporting of losses by finding that board 
turnover is higher when losses are reported. Consistent with a profit objective, such 
turnover was found to be higher in for-profit hospitals than not-for-profit hospitals 
(Eldenburg et al. 2004). Hoerger (1991) similarly finds that the variability of 
profitability is greater in for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. In the not-for-profit 
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sector in the US, the manipulation of accounting numbers has also been found in the 
form of cost-shifting in response to managerial compensation incentives (Krishnan et 
al. 2006, Jones and Roberts 2006) and in order to reduce reported administrative and 
fund-raising expenditure for the purposes of enhancing the perceived efficiency of the 
entity by donors (Krishnan and Yetman 2011).  
Prior research in the private sector indicates that the regulatory setting, and the 
possibility of increased regulatory scrutiny in particular, creates incentives for the 
management of reported financial performance (Jones 1991, Mensah et al. 1994, 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Kasznik 1999, Navissi 1999). There are currently no 
equivalent studies in the public sector environment. Public sector entities have 
conventionally been subject to a direct performance management regime, associated 
with a command and control culture, rather than the independent regulation which is 
associated with higher levels of managerial freedom. The institutional setting of 
Foundation Trusts, which is characterised by strong regulatory oversight offers an 
opportunity to address this gap.  
A number of studies investigating accruals management in the public and not-
for-profit sectors adopt the model developed by Leone and Van Horn (2005). They 
found a negative association between discretionary accruals and pre-managed 
performance and that discretionary accruals were managed to reduce both surpluses and 
deficits by about 44%. Elsewhere, in Portuguese municipalities and in the wider not-
for-profit sector, the reduction is found to be between 40% and 80% (Ferreira et al. 
2013, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012). However in a study of UK universities, 
Greenwood and Tao (2016) find that financial reporting quality improves with the 
extent of regulatory monitoring, as proxied by the proportion of public funds sourced 
from the sector regulator. This effect has also been observed in the US healthcare sector 
where Krishnan and Yetman (2011), in a study of  not-for-profit hospitals, find that 
cost-shifting aimed at enhancing efficiency ratios is reduced with the proportion of 
funding sourced from the Medicare and Medicaid programmes. We contribute to this 
literature by investigating the extent of accruals management in a healthcare setting 
which is funded, almost entirely, by regulated public funding.   
In the UK, Ballantine et al. (2007) have investigated accruals management in 
the public sector setting of English National Health Service (NHS) Trusts, the 
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predecessors of NHS Foundation Trusts. NHS Trusts were subject to direct 
performance management by the Department of Health and the primary financial 
objective was a statutorily enshrined annual performance target of financial breakeven 
(National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990). In this institutional setting 
the use of discretionary accruals to report small surpluses just above zero was found to 
be particularly marked. However, with the establishment, from 2004-05, of Foundation 
Trusts, the emphasis moved away from a primary focus on financial breakeven to 
performance evaluation based on multiple financial metrics and the generation of 
surpluses to fund service development. We contribute to the literature by investigating 
the impact of this new regulatory regime on financial reporting quality.  
3 Regulatory setting and hypothesis development 
NHS Foundation Trusts were established from 2004-05 as the preferred model 
of healthcare service delivery in England (Health and Social Care (Community Health 
and Standards) Act 2003). As at the end of 2013-14 there were 147 Foundation Trusts 
in total, represented by 101 trusts delivering acute hospital services and 46 delivering 
mental health or ambulance services. They receive most of their capital, in the form of 
‘taxpayers’ equity’, and revenues, in the form of contracted payments for patient 
treatments, from other public bodies but are free from central government control. 
Instead, they report directly to Parliament and are subject to regulation by an 
independent regulator, Monitor.  A distinctive feature of the setting is that, unlike their 
predecessor organisations (NHS Trusts) and other public sector entities, they are 
expected to generate surpluses for reinvestment into the strategic development of their 
services, over which they exercise a large degree of autonomy. A further radical 
innovation in the context of Foundation Trusts is their ability to borrow money from 
commercial markets to further fund their development. 
Monitor adopts a risk based approach to regulation: the level of scrutiny and of 
intervention is determined by a financial risk rating5 and a prudential borrowing limit 
whose aim is to protect continuity of service by acting as a measure of financial viability 
(Monitor 2013).   
                                                 
5 ‘Financial risk rating’ is the regulator’s terminology to distinguish it from service based non-financial 
metrics such as waiting times for treatment. However the ‘financial risk rating’ includes metrics which 
are related to operational performance (such as EBITDA and % of plan EBITDA achieved) as well as 
metrics related for example to liquidity. 
Page 8 of 46 
 
The financial risk rating is determined by performance against 5 component 
metrics. Figure 1 shows that these are categorised as being related to financial 
efficiency (measured by the I&E surplus margin and return on assets - total weighting 
40%); underlying performance, (measured by the EBITDA margin % - weighting 25 
%); liquidity (weighting 25%) and plan performance (measured by EBITDA as a % of 
plan – weighting 10%). 
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
A component risk rating of between 1 (poor) and 5 (good) is first determined 
by the threshold levels of performance in Figure 1. Appropriate weightings are then 
applied to these component risk ratings to arrive at a final overall risk rating of between 
1 and 5.  Risk ratings below 3 result in additional monitoring and other forms of 
intervention whilst risk ratings of 4 and above trigger less frequent monitoring, from 
quarterly to bi-annually, and the potential for greater managerial autonomy.  An 
example illustrating how the final rating is calculated is included in  Figure 1.  This 
shows that a Trust with an I&E surplus margin of 0.8% (component rating 2), an ROA 
of 3.5% (component rating 3), EBITDA margin of 6.2% (component rating 3), liquidity 
of 28 days (component rating 4) and a plan performance of 83% (component rating 3), 
achieves an overall financial risk rating of 3. This Trust’s performance is therefore 
above the threshold for intervention even though the I&E surplus component falls 
below a 3 rating. 
The risk rating system also has features which discourage year-end accruals 
management: it is multi-dimensional such that the impact of manipulation is rendered 
less readily computable; the flattery of current year financial performance at the 
expense of future reported performance is mitigated by the capping of ratings for Trusts 
forecasting losses (Monitor 2009b, p.15); and finally, over-optimism in forecasting is 
discouraged through the % of plan performance metric (see Figure 1). However, 
notwithstanding these features, the framework creates incentives to manage 
performance in order to first, avoid intervention in the event of poor performance and 
second, to trigger rewards for better performance. This latter incentive is, however, 
tempered by incentives to manage performance downwards in order to signal efficiency 
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and effectiveness in the use of resources; to avoid the adverse publicity associated with 
the reporting of high surpluses; and, in a period of pressures on public spending and 
year-on-year requirements to deliver efficiency savings, a desire to provide a 
contingency against future cost and revenue pressures. In this context accruals 
management has been a matter of concern to the regulator because when the health 
service is under financial pressure there is a heightened imperative to demonstrate 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds, not only in individual trusts but 
across the whole healthcare system.6  
The second key metric which can determine regulatory intervention is the 
‘Prudential Borrowing Limit’. The ability to borrow funds from commercial sources is 
an NPM-inspired innovation which has the objective of delivering greater flexibility 
and managerial autonomy to Foundation Trusts in order to develop their services. 
However, to protect services from risky borrowing, this facility is regulated by the 
Prudential Borrowing Code (Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) Act 2003, s.12, Monitor 2009a). Based on experience in the US where not-
for-profit hospitals with credit ratings equivalent to the minimum investment grade of 
BBB (Standard and Poor’s, Fitch) have access to a wider range of affordable funding, 
the Prudential Borrowing Code requires that Foundation Trusts maintain a level of 
liquidity which is consistent with a BBB credit rating. This is determined by reference 
to four key ratios, based on annual plan projections, for which minimum levels of 
performance are required. The ratios are dividend7 cover, interest cover, debt service 
cover and debt service as a % of revenue. The minimum levels of performance can be 
seen in Figure 2. Breach of any one of these thresholds, either on actual or revised 
forecast performance, has the potential to trigger regulatory intervention and a 
reduction in borrowing capacity, thereby creating an incentive to manage performance 
to avoid breach of the prudential borrowing limit. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
                                                 
6 This insight was obtained during an interview with a Monitor representative.  
7 The taxpayers’ equity which funds Foundation Trusts is provided subject to the requirement to pay an 
annual ‘public’ dividend currently set at 3.5%. 
Page 10 of 46 
 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
Public motivation theory and the presence of a strong monitoring framework 
which incorporates features which discourage the management of accruals leads to our 
null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: There is no variation in discretionary accruals with pre-managed 
financial performance. 
However, the regulatory environment of Foundation Trusts introduces 
incentives for the management of accruals and we therefore supplement this null 
hypothesis with alternative hypotheses. 
Prior research in the public and not-for-profit sectors has found a negative 
association between discretionary accruals and pre-managed surpluses (Leone and Van 
Horn 2005, Ferreira et al. 2005, Verbruggen and Christiaens 2012) in response to 
incentives to signal efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources, avoidance of 
the adverse consequences of reporting a deficit and weak incentives for reporting large 
surpluses.  Ballantine et al also find accruals management in response to incentives to 
provide contingencies against future reductions in income and/or rises in costs. Similar 
incentives for managing accruals to report small surpluses exist  in the Foundation Trust 
regime and we therefore expect discretionary accruals to be performance increasing in 
the presence of a pre-discretionary deficit and performance decreasing in the presence 
of a pre-discretionary surplus.  
H1: There will be a negative association between discretionary accruals and 
the pre-managed surplus. 
However, the Foundation Trust regulatory regime introduces new incentives for 
managing accruals so we test the general alternative hypothesis: 
H2: Discretionary accruals are additionally managed in response to specific 
incentives introduced by the regulatory regime 
The strongest incentive is that of intervention avoidance: 
H2a: Discretionary accruals are additionally performance increasing to avoid 
intervention, i.e. when the pre-managed risk rating is 2 or when the pre-
managed prudential borrowing limit is breached.  
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For each of the other pre-managed risk ratings, the incentives for accruals 
management over and above that captured by H1 are less clear. At levels of 
performance which are well above the threshold for intervention (pre-managed risk 
ratings of 4 or 5) the incentives to reduce reported performance are captured by the pre-
managed surplus in H1 and it is questionable as to whether the incentives to create 
contingencies against future cost and revenue pressures and to maintain a reputation for 
sustained good performance, which are not specific to the Foundation Trust setting, 
would result in accruals management greater than this. For those Trusts with a pre-
managed risk rating of 3, rewards in the form of lower monitoring levels provide an 
incentive to manage performance upwards to gain a risk rating of 4 but this is moderated 
by the incentives to sustain performance over the medium term and to avoid future 
intervention. A Trust is unlikely to manage performance upwards this year if that puts 
at risk the ability to achieve a 3 rating in future years. On the other hand, at low levels 
of performance (pre-managed risk rating of 1) there may be issues of managerial 
competence with little scope of avoiding intervention. There may also be, for some 
Trusts, the possibility of ‘big bath’ accounting in order to flatter future reported 
performance and risk ratings.  
Thus, in all the above circumstances, the alternative hypothesis is ambivalent 
about the level of additional accruals management: 
H2b: For a pre-managed risk rating of 1, 3, 4 or 5 the level of accruals 
management is consistent with H1, i.e. no additional management 
Finally, despite the move away from financial breakeven as the primary 
performance benchmark, loss aversion remains as a feature of the regulatory regime 
and both private sector and public sector literature finds that small loss avoidance is a 
strong motivator for accruals management. 
H2c: Discretionary accruals will be more positive for small pre-
managed deficits 
To test these hypotheses we estimate discretionary accruals and investigate 
whether there is any variation with the pre-managed risk rating and with the prudential 
borrowing limit. 
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4 Research design 
4.1 Sample and data  
Our sample includes all Foundation Trusts over the five year period from 2009-
10 to 2013-14. The number of Trusts increases from 129 in 2009-10 to 147 in 2013-14 
giving a total of 700 Trust observations. However, as a result of the deduction of part-
year observations for Trusts which come into existence part way through the financial 
year, the absence of lagged observations for new Trusts, and the requirement for leading 
and lagging data in the modelling of discretionary accruals our sample reduces to 518 
observations representing the four years from 2009-10 to 2012-13.  The final sample 
for our multivariate analysis is further reduced to 332 observations as a consequence of 
the requirement for lagged data and 41 missing data for Trusts working capital facility.8 
Financial statement data for the years 2009-10 and 2010-11, and lagged 
variables for 2008-09, were obtained from the Laing and Buisson database of NHS 
financial statements. Data for 2011-12 to 2013-14 data was accessed direct from the 
Monitor consolidation schedules as was data for the working capital facility throughout 
the period of our study.9 Plan data was not available and is therefore omitted from our 
analysis. 
4.2 Accruals modelling  
In this paper, we adopt an aggregate accruals method. Although both aggregate 
accruals and the specific accrual of depreciation have been investigated in prior 
literature, no management of depreciation has been found (Stalebrink 2007, Pilcher and 
Van der Zahn 2010) and, in the Foundation Trust context both bad debts and inventory, 
which have been investigated elsewhere (Marquardt and Wiedman 2004), are low. In 
contrast there is flexibility in payables. Accrued expenses, for example, comprise many 
small items and have been rising over the period of our study.10 There also exists the 
                                                 
8 This data is required for a calculation of the liquidity metric – see Figure 1. 
9 Monitor consolidation schedules were accessed via: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/foundation-trust-consolidation-ftc-accounts-data. The 
publication of these schedules represents a recent innovation by Monitor in response to this study..  
Monitor has confirmed that the data in the 2009-10 and 2010-11 data in the Laing and Buisson 
database has been taken from their consolidation schedules and the two sources are therefore 
identical. 
10 The mean value of payables over the period of our study has risen from 11% of assets (£19m) in 2010 
to 14% (£30m) in 2014. Over the same period cash has risen 13% of assets (£22m) in 2010 to 17.5% 
in 2013, falling slightly to 15% (£29m) in 2014. This has been a particular concern of the regulator 
because cash has also been rising and this raises questions about allocative efficiency, overall system 
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possibility of exploiting long term provisions as a means of managing performance. For 
well-performing Trusts this is particularly beneficial because a long term provision can 
be increased and reduce the operating and surplus margins without adversely 
influencing the liquidity position. We therefore incorporate variations in our definition 
of the accruals that we investigate to capture both long term provisions and 
depreciation.  
The basis for our modelling of accruals is the model of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) which is based on cash flows. We adapt this model as recommended by 
McNichols (2002), and applied by Ballantine et al. (2007), to accommodate changes in 
revenue and the level of PPE (Equation 1).  Using a pooled OLS regression, we estimate 
discretionary accruals as follows:  
 
1 2 1 3 4 1 5 6it it it it it it itWC CFO CFO CFO REV PPE                   [1] 
Where: DWC
it
 is calculated as the change in non-cash current assets from time 
t-1 to time t, minus the change in cash and minus the change in current liabilities for 
entity i; CFO
it-1
, CFO
it
 and CFO
it+1
represent lagged, contemporaneous and leading 
cash flows from operations; DREV
it
 is the change in revenue from time t-1 to time t; 
PPE
it
 is property, plant and equipment at time t; e
it
is the residual, a measure of 
discretionary accruals. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Ballantine et al. 
2007,). Further, to reflect the specific accounting and regulatory environment of 
Foundation Trusts and the potential use of long term accruals to manage reported 
financial performance, we also use alternative definitions of working capital to include 
depreciation and the change in long term provisions.  The results of these estimations 
show that the inclusion of depreciation and long term provisions in our definition of 
working capital generates the highest explanatory power and we therefore adopt this 
definition for the purposes of our second stage analysis.  
                                                 
wide performance and the potential for public and political pressure for cash balances to be reduced 
in favour of improved services. 
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4.3 Model development 
To investigate the extent to which discretionary accruals vary in response to 
regulatory incentives we follow Leone & Van Horne’s (2005) model which tests for 
variation of discretionary accruals in a not-for-profit setting. They model discretionary 
accruals as a function of pre-managed performance, of last year’s reported performance 
and last year’s discretionary accruals. 
To test our hypotheses we adapt this model by introducing an indicator variable 
which represents the pre-managed risk rating. We also include control variables for 
trust type, location and size, and year dummies to accommodate yearly variations for 
example in funding and in demand. We estimate the following regression: 
 
3
0 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 7 1 7
1
2
j
it it it it it it j j it
j
DA Pre-mSurp Rating RepSurp DA Region Type TI YEAR         

   

         
      
 
Where: DA is discretionary accruals from the estimation model, equation [1]; 
Pre-mSurp represents the pre-managed surplus scaled by lagged total assets; Rating is 
the pre-managed risk rating taking the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 (where 4 captures a risk 
rating of both 4 and 5); RepSurp is reported surplus scaled by lagged total assets.  
This model allows for performance matching through the continuous variable 
RepSurpit-1 (Kothari et al. 2005) and for the reversing out of discretionary accruals 
through the lagged variable DAit-1 11. Region and Type  are control variables representing 
location and Trust type based on the regulator’s classifications of acute, acute specialist, 
acute teaching, mental health and ambulance; TIit-1 is lagged total income, a control 
variable for Trust size; YEAR is an indicator variable for the years 2010-11 to 2012- 
2013; is theerror term. Control variables are included to control for the possibility 
that local health economy factors, organisational size and organisational complexity or 
business model affect the level of discretionary accruals. 
To calculate the pre-managed ‘financial risk rating’ we first compute the four 
pre-managed component ratings of I&E surplus margin, EBITDA margin, ROA and 
liquidity metric using Monitor’s reporting template12 for each year of our study. Thus 
                                                 
11 Dechow et al. (2012) use a binary variable to allow for the reversing out of accruals. In this method 
we use, consistent with Leone and Van Horn (2005), a continuous variable to control for the potential 
autocorrelation in discretionary accruals. 
12 We are grateful to Monitor for access to these templates. 
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any minor changes in the metrics over the period, as shown in Figure 3, have been 
incorporated into our estimates. For the I&E surplus margin, the EBITDA margin and 
the ROA metrics, discretionary accruals are deducted from the reported EBITDA and 
I&E surplus figures and from the assets/capital employed figure; for the liquidity metric 
discretionary accruals are deducted from the reported ‘net liquid resources’ 13  and 
operating expenses. A pre-managed aggregate rating is then computed on the basis of 
these four metrics14. Data for the ‘performance against plan’ metric, which represents 
10% of the final risk rating was not accessible and therefore was omitted from our 
calculation. We discuss the implications of this for the interpretation of our findings in 
Section 5.3. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
We further investigate the influence on financial reporting quality of a pre-
managed breach of the prudential borrowing limit and, in order to gain some insight 
into the management of individual component metrics of the risk rating, a pre-managed 
component rating of 2 (signalling the risk of intervention) for each of  the EBITDA%, 
surplus %, ROA% and liquidity metrics.   
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Where: Comp is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 when the pre-
managed prudential borrowing limit is breached or when an individual component of 
the risk rating (EBITDA%, surplus %, ROA% and liquidity) is 2. To compute the pre-
managed prudential borrowing metric we deduct discretionary accruals from the 
reported ‘revenue available for debt service’ (see Figure 2).  
                                                 
13  Net liquid resources are defined as: Current Assets (excl. Inventories, Derivative Related Assets, 
Available/Held for Sale Assets and Charitable Funds Assets) – Current Liabilities (excl. Charitable Funds 
Liabilities) + any unused ‘Committed Working Capital Facilities’. Foundation Trusts are required by the regulator 
to have working capital facilities in place with banks amounting to  about one month’s operational expenditure. 
(See Figure 3). 
14 The weightings of 20%, 20%, 25% and 25% are applied (as per Figure 1) to each of the I&E surplus 
margin, the ROA metrics, the EBITDA margin and the liquidity metric respectively. The sum of these 
weighted ranking (which excludes the ‘performance against plan’ metric (weighting 10%) is then 
grossed up (divided by 0.9) to arrive at the equivalent ‘financial risk rating’. 
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However, whilst we predict accruals management in response to a potential 
breach of the prudential borrowing limit (Hypothesis 2a) it is not possible to make the 
same prediction about individual component metrics. As illustrated in Figure 2 a rating 
of 2 on one metric may be offset by performance on one or more other metrics, resulting 
in a 3 (or greater) rating overall. Nonetheless this part of our analysis will provide some 
insights into the underlying dynamics of accruals management in this setting.   
Our predictions for the expected signs on each of the independent variables can 
be found in Figure 4. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The coefficient on Pre-mSurp in equations 2 and 3 tests Hypothesis 1 and 
we expect this coefficient to take a negative value to indicate income increasing 
(decreasing) discretionary accruals for pre-managed deficits(surpluses). The coefficient 
on Rating in equation 2 and on Comp in equation 3 tests hypothesis 2a.  We expect 
this coefficient to be positive when the pre-managed risk rating is 2 and when the pre-
managed prudential borrowing limit is breached, indicating additional accruals 
management to avoid regulatory intervention. Finally, the coefficient on Comp in 
equation 3 also tests Hypothesis 2b. We expect  to be positive for a small pre-
managed deficit indicating additional accruals management in order to avoid reporting 
a small loss.  We predict no  additional accruals management when the pre-managed 
risk rating is 1, 3, 4 or 5. 
 
5 Findings  
5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Descriptive statistics for our sample which set the context for our investigations 
are shown in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Table 1 shows that the mean total income of our sample is £267m and mean 
total assets £202m. Mean EBITDA and I&E surplus as a % of income amount to 6.1% 
and 1.6% respectively. Median values are similar at 6.0% and 1.4% respectively. Thus 
both mean and median values are above the thresholds (I&E 1% and EBITDA 5%) for 
a component risk rating of 3. The I&E surplus margin in comparison with the EBITDA 
margin is more dispersed, less negatively skewed (-0.5 vs -1.0) and more leptokurtic 
(kurtosis = 19.7 vs 8.6). The closer proximity of the mean I&E performance (1.6%) to 
the threshold (1%) and its higher dispersion (3.5%) suggest that the I&E margin may 
be more of a binding constraint than the EBITDA margin which at a mean value of 
6.1% and lower dispersion (2.9%) suggests more flexibility in achievement. In the full 
sample of 518 observations, a count of those achieving the EBITDA and I&E margins 
associated with a component rating of 3, reveals that 343 observations achieve the I&E 
surplus target of 1% whereas 405 achieve the comparable EBITDA target of 5%. With 
regard to liquidity the mean value of 29 days is well above the threshold (15 days) for 
a component risk rating of 3 but has large variability (standard deviation = 26 days). 
The mean value of the ROA of 3.4% is close to the threshold for a 3 rating (3%) 
reflecting the similarity of the surplus measure with that used for the I&E surplus 
margin. The high standard deviation (6.4) reflects the high variability in the asset base. 
The remaining rows of Table 1 set the context in which we investigate the potential for 
accruals management. In comparison with the mean I&E surplus of £4.3m, the mean 
value of net current assets (including cash) is £11.2m. The mean value of payables is 
£25m representing almost 10% of total income. The mean value of depreciation, which 
does not affect the EBITDA margin but does have the potential for contributing to the 
management of the I&E surplus and the ROA metrics, is £7.4m. The mean bad debt 
expense is low at £0.3m but again with wide variability (min £-4.4m, max £9.6m). Long 
term provisions amount to £1.8m (mean). Other figures in Table 1 illustrate that 
elsewhere there may limited scope for managing discretionary accruals: inventory is 
low with a mean value of £3m as are receivables which, with a mean value of £11.4m, 
represent just 16 days of revenue, and which are represented largely (over 80%) by 
NHS balances15.  
We proceed to report in Table 2 the pairwise correlations for the component risk 
ratings and the prudential borrowing limit indicator. The components of the financial 
                                                 
15 Non NHS receivables (not tabulated) have a mean value of about £1m. 
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risk rating are likely to be highly correlated as an improvement (worsening) in one 
metric such as EBITDA will be accompanied by an improvement in all the other risk 
rating components. As expected Table 2 shows the expected high levels of correlation 
for each variable, with the possible exception of the liquidity rating. As a consequence, 
in our multivariate analysis, we first apply Equation 3 to each component metric before 
including all four metrics in the one regression 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Then, as a first stage of our investigation of accruals management in response 
to regulatory incentives, Table 3 presents discretionary accruals analysed by the pre-
managed risk rating. This shows that discretionary accruals for a pre-managed risk 
rating of 2 are performance increasing to the extent of 1.1% of lagged total assets 
(p=0.000) or about £2.2m for a Trust with mean assets. For a Trust with a risk rating of 
4 or 5 discretionary accruals are income decreasing to the extent of 1.6% of lagged total 
assets (p=0.002) or about £3.2m for a Trust with mean assets. The discretionary 
accruals for observations where the pre-managed risk rating is very poor (1) or just 
above the threshold for intervention (3) are not significantly different from zero. These 
findings provide prima facie evidence that the null hypothesis of no variation in 
discretionary accruals with underlying performance can be rejected. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of Equation 2.  Columns 1-4 show the results for each 
rating of 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more (respectively) and Column 5 shows the results for a 
regression which includes all ratings, using a rating of 3 as the baseline group. The 
coefficient on the pre-managed surplus (Pre-mSurp) is negative and significant in all 
cases at 1%. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis of no variation in discretionary 
accruals with underlying performance. The coefficient (in the order of -0.1) indicates 
that approximately 10% of the pre-managed surplus is reversed out through the use of 
discretionary accruals. This is lower than in prior studies and is consistent with 
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Hypothesis 1. The results further show that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, discretionary 
accruals additionally vary with the pre-managed financial risk rating. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, when the pre-managed rating is 2 (Column 2), discretionary accruals 
are found to be more positive (coefficient 0.011, p<0.01) and therefore performance 
enhancing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, there is no evidence of additional accruals 
management for a pre-managed rating of 1 or 3. However, for a pre-managed risk rating 
of 4 or 5 above, and contrary to Hypothesis 2b, discretionary accruals are found to be 
more negative (coefficient =-0.018, p<0.01) indicating that performance is reduced 
over and above the levels predicted by the Leone and Van Horn (2005) model. This 
finding is consistent with strong incentives to protect future performance and raises 
questions as to whether the linear model of discretionary accruals which underpins the 
Leone and Van Horn model adequately captures accruals management at high levels of 
pre-managed performance. The incentives related to the protection of future 
performance and the avoidance of political and public scrutiny are not specific to the 
Foundation Trust setting and therefore the behaviour of discretionary accruals at high 
levels of pre-managed performance warrants further investigation in alternative settings 
Column 5 shows that when the pre-managed risk ratings are taken together, the 
results are similar.. Amongst the control variables, there is some variation with the type 
of Trust. Discretionary accruals are lower in ambulance trusts and higher in mental 
health and specialist trusts as compared with the reference group of acute Trusts. 
Location however has no impact, and size, although statistically significant (p<0.05), 
has no economic significance (coefficient =0.00).  
Taken together our findings are consistent with the management of accruals to 
avoid regulatory intervention not only in the short term (discretionary accruals are 
income increasing when there is a small pre-managed deficit) but also in the medium 
term (discretionary accruals are income decreasing when there is a pre-managed surplus 
and are more so when the pre-managed surplus is well above intervention triggering 
thresholds). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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Table 5 shows the results for equation 3 which tests for accruals management 
when the pre-managed prudential borrowing limit is breached and when each 
component risk rating is 2, potentially signalling intervention. Discretionary accruals 
are more positive for a breach of the prudential borrowing limit (1.6% of assets, p<0.01) 
and when the pre-managed I&E surplus component rating is 2 (1.3% of assets, p<0.01).  
This suggests that the management of accruals to avoid regulatory intervention is being 
driven by what could arguably be described as two ‘strategic’ metrics, the I&E surplus, 
which is the headline performance metric for a large range of stakeholders, and the 
prudential borrowing limit, which has implications for the strategic capacity of the 
Trust. The I&E surplus metric also appears to be a tighter constraint (as indicated by 
the descriptive statistics in Table 1) than for example the EBITDA metric and may 
therefore be more vulnerable to a poor rating. A low rating on other metrics may be 
representative of much poorer overall performance and the risk rating may therefore be 
less amenable to management.  
Overall, the levels of additional discretionary accruals at 1-2% of assets (£2-4m 
for a Trust with mean assets of £201m) is consistent with audit materiality levels which 
are conventionally set  at 1-2% of revenue, in accordance with International Auditing 
Standard (IAS) 320 (para. A7).16Within the context of the margins which feature in 
Monitor’s regulatory regime however these materiality thresholds allow sufficient 
flexibility for the management of discretionary accruals to influence the final risk rating 
for the Trust.17  
As a further test of the management of accruals to avoid intervention we test 
whether discretionary accruals are managed upwards when pre-managed performance 
against each component of EBITDA%, I&E surplus %, ROA% and Liquidity (days) 
falls within a small range just below the threshold for a component rating of 3. 
Significant findings of accruals management in these performance bands would support 
the argument that discretionary accruals were being managed to avoid intervention. The 
ranges we choose are 1% below the EBITDA threshold of 5%, 0.5% below the I&E 
threshold of 1%, 0.5% below the ROA threshold of 3% and 2.5 days below the liquidity 
threshold of 15. We also incorporate into this analysis a test of Hypothesis 2c that small 
                                                 
16  Available at: http://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a018-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-320.pdf 
(accessed 10 November 2016) 
17 We are grateful to Monitor for these insights 
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loss avoidance persists within the risk rating regime. The results are shown in Table 6. 
They are consistent with those in Table 4 in that accruals are higher for the I&E surplus, 
but not for the other metrics. The table additionally provides evidence that discretionary 
accruals are higher when pre-managed performance falls just below financial 
breakeven. A coefficient of 0.011 (p<0.01) indicates that for a pre-managed deficit of 
up to 0.5% revenue (£1.2m for a Trust with mean revenue), discretionary accruals are 
higher by c. £2m (for a Trust with mean assets) thereby providing evidence that, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2c, discretionary accruals are used to convert small 
underlying deficits into small reported surpluses.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
We supplement the investigation of loss avoidance by conducting a three way 
analysis of the I&E surplus margin before and after discretionary accruals. Using the 
full sample of 518 observations for the four years from 2009-10 to 2012-13, Table 7 
shows that of the 105 Trust observations with a pre-managed deficit, 71 (40+31) 
reported a surplus, and 31 reported a surplus of more than 1%, the threshold for a 
component risk rating of 3. Given the 460 (343+117) observations with a reported 
surplus this represents a false positive rate of 15%. Further, of the 343 observations 
with a reported surplus above 1%, 74 (43+31) had an underlying surplus of less than 
1%, representing a false positive rate of 21%. The null hypothesis of an independent 
distribution of observations is rejected (Chi-sq(4)= 156.1, p=0.000)18 providing prima 
facie evidence of the use of discretionary accruals to report an I&E surplus to achieve 
regulatory thresholds. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
                                                 
18 Although the Chi-square test is limited in its ability to provide information about the strength of the 
relationships, and is sensitive to the size of the population and to low frequencies of observations, the 
Chi-square statistic here is well above that required to generate a p=0.000 statistic (chi-sq =20), the 
population size is modest at 518 observations and the lowest number of observations in a cell is greater 
than the minimum 5 which would trigger concern.  
Page 22 of 46 
 
We also test whether discretionary accruals in the intervals just above the 
threshold levels for a component risk rating of 3, and just below the threshold for a risk 
rating of 2, are significantly different from the rest.  Evidence of accruals management 
in these performance bands would undermine the assumption of discretionary accruals 
management to avoid intervention. The results are shown in Table 8. We find no 
evidence of additional discretionary accruals in these performance bands. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
In all the above tables the underlying reduction in reported surpluses/deficits is 
in the order of 10-11%. This is below the level found by Leone and Van Horn (2005) 
in US not for profit hospitals (44%), by Ferreira et al. (2005) in Portuguese 
municipalities (40-80%) and by Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) in Belgian not-for-
profit entities (57%). This lower level, is consistent with the move away from financial 
breakeven as the principal financial objective, with the integral features of the 
regulatory regime which discourage gaming, and also with early findings that the higher 
the proportion of funding obtained from regulated public sources the lower the 
reduction of underlying surpluses and deficits through the use of discretionary accruals 
(Greenwood and Tao, 2016).  
5.3 Robustness testing and limitations of analysis  
A number of research design choices have been made in this paper in relation 
to the estimation of discretionary accruals and the pre-managed risk rating. In this 
section we discuss these and their implications for our analysis. 
For the estimation of discretionary accruals, we chose the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model as amended and applied in Ballantine et al. (2007) for the estimation of 
discretionary accruals on the grounds that this model delivers higher explanatory power 
than the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). However, this modelling approach 
has been criticised (Wysocki 2009) as being poorly suited to the testing of earnings 
management on the basis that discretionary accruals made with the intention of 
smoothing earnings will tend to be classified as nondiscretionary. We therefore test our 
findings using first, the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and second, using 
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the approach adopted by Dechow et al. (2012)19. We then apply the discretionary 
accruals we derive to Equations 2 and 3 and in all cases the findings (both coefficients 
and statistical significance) are similar.  
We use a pooled OLS regression to estimate discretionary accruals. An 
alternative, annual cross-sectional estimation of discretionary accruals delivers similar 
co-efficients but with stronger significance for some variables. For example, the co-
efficient on the pre-managed risk rating of 3 is negative, significant and similar to that 
in Table 4, confirming the pattern of an increasing rate of accruals management with 
pre-managed financial performance. This lends further weight to the conclusion that 
protection against future intervention represents a stronger incentive than rewards in 
the form of greater managerial autonomy. In Table 5, using the OLS regression, we 
found weak significance (10%) for the management of discretionary accruals upwards 
when the ROA and EBITDA component ratings were 2.When discretionary accruals 
are estimated using a cross-sectional model the co-efficients are again similar but with 
a stronger significance (<1%). There is no change in insignificance attached to a 2 rating 
of the liquidity metric. This strengthens the proposition that a component rating of 2 
may trigger discretionary accruals management. 
With respect to the calculation of the pre-managed risk rating, our calculation 
of the pre-managed liquidity component assumes that all discretionary accruals are 
working capital accruals. We test the robustness of our findings by assuming that only 
half of the discretionary accruals are working capital accruals. The results are similar 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Finally, we have sought in this paper to investigate the responsiveness of 
discretionary accruals to regulatory incentives in the Foundation Trust setting. Our 
estimation of the pre-managed financial risk rating was based on four of the five 
component metrics. The plan performance metric, with a weighting of 10%, was 
omitted as the data was not available. This introduces measurement error into our 
estimation of the aggregate pre-managed performance rating. However, the probability 
                                                 
19  We identify Trust observations vulnerable to accruals management as those which just pass the 
threshold for a risk rating of 3 and allow for the reversing out of accruals in the following years 1 and 
2. 
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of a mis-categorisation is low20 and biases our results in favour of our hypothesis  2a: 
that accruals are managed upward in order to avoid regulatory intervention. 
6 Discussion and conclusions  
Risk based models of regulation are increasingly being adopted, internationally, 
for the regulation of public services. This paper investigates variations in discretionary 
accruals in response to the regulatory incentives associated with such a model of public 
service delivery, that of NHS Foundation Trusts, where the level of monitoring and 
intervention is determined by performance against two key financial performance 
metrics: a financial risk rating and a prudential borrowing limit.  
Overall, consistent with prior research and with general public and not-for-
profit incentives to signal competence and efficiency in the use of resources, we find 
that discretionary accruals are managed to reduce the overall variation in reported 
performance: performance is managed upwards when there is a pre-managed deficit 
and downwards when there is a pre-managed surplus. However, the level of accruals 
management is lower than has been found in other not for profit settings, perhaps 
reflecting the strength of the control environment. Trusts are required to submit 
quarterly monitoring returns, with increased scrutiny if performance falls below certain 
thresholds. Few other settings are subject to this level of monitoring at the 
organisational level though with the rise of risk based regulation we may see the 
increased use of such systems for public sector organisations. The influence of 
monitoring strength on public sector financial reporting quality is worthy of further 
research. We further contribute to the literature by finding that, in addition, 
discretionary accruals are managed to avoid intervention.. They are performance 
                                                 
20 The omission of the plan metric in our estimation of the pre-managed risk rating could result 
in error if the inclusion of the plan metric would result in a change in our classification of a 2 rating to a 
3 rating or from a 3 rating to a 2 rating. The probability of this is low.  
To result in a misclassification of a Trust as having a  financial risk rating of 2 would require a 
% of plan rating of  4 combined with a 4 rating on either the I&E surplus or the ROA metrics and a 2 
rating on the EBITDA or liquidity rating, with the balance of the metrics having a 3 rating. 
To result in a misclassification of a Trust as a 3 rating would require a % plan rating of 2 or 1 
combined with all other metrics being classified as 3. Following consultation with auditors and financial 
representatives of Foundation Trusts we judge this scenario to be unlikely as Trusts aim to protect their 
performance rating at a level of 3 or above by planning conservatively. 
Misclassifications bias our findings in favour of our hypothesis 2a because misclassification of 
a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 3 when inclusion of the plan metric would indicate a 2 
rating would result in overstatement of discretionary accruals associated with a 3 rating in our model. 
Similarly, mis-classification of a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 2 when inclusion of the 
plan metric would indicate a 3 rating would serve to underestimate the discretionary accruals associated 
with a 2 rating in our model. 
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increasing when pre-managed performance is just below the intervention threshold (a 
risk rating of 2, or when the prudential borrowing limit is breached) and performance 
decreasing when performance is well above threshold (a risk rating of 4 or 5). The latter 
finding is consistent with a strong desire to reduce large surpluses and to protect future 
performance against the possibility of regulatory intervention and suggests that at high 
levels of performance incentives for good performance, in this case in the form of lower 
monitoring and potential access to additional resources, are relatively ineffective. It also 
raises questions about the linear model of discretionary accruals assumed by Leone and 
Van Horn (2005). Our findings suggest that there may be a non-linear relationship at 
high levels of pre-managed performance and that further research in other settings 
would help to refine our understanding of accruals management in not-for-profit and 
public sector settings. 
A further finding is that the incentive to achieve minimum levels of performance 
in order to avoid intervention has not displaced an aversion to the reporting of small 
losses. This finding is consistent with prior research in both the public and private 
sectors, a general aversion to losses which is a feature of the overall regulatory 
framework, and with the desire to signal competence and efficiency, particularly to a 
wider stakeholder audience who may be less concerned with the other metrics used by 
the regulator 
Taken together, this additional accruals management demonstrates that the use 
of an aggregated performance metric with features which aim to mitigate gaming does 
not preclude accruals management within acceptable audit materiality limits of 1-2% 
of revenue. Our findings also demonstrate that incentives to report high levels of 
financial performance, in the form of additional managerial autonomy, are not so strong 
as to affect financial reporting quality. In the public and not-for-profit settings the 
acceptability of stronger incentives for increased surplus reporting for example in the 
form of remuneration incentives  (as investigated in Eldenburg et al, 2004)  is debatable 
and could lead to reduced financial reporting quality. However, as healthcare services 
continue to be subject to reform,  with the proposed unwinding of ‘Obama-care’ in the 
US and increased marketization elsewhere, further research into the conditions under 
which financial reporting quality is affected by incentives for ‘better’ financial 
performance would be helpful in informing regulatory design. Comparative studies 
either internationally or within a setting such as the US where the healthcare providers 
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operate across both not for profit and profit sectors, and in a variety of institutional 
settings, would facilitate a deeper understanding of these issues.  
We further find that the management of discretionary accruals is driven by two 
metrics of strategic significance, the I&E surplus margin and the prudential borrowing 
limit. Discretionary accruals are higher, on average, by 1.3% of total assets (or £2.5m 
for a Trust with mean assets) when the I&E surplus margin falls below 1% (£2.7m for 
a Trust with mean revenue), the potentially intervention triggering threshold for a 
component risk rating of 2. Both the scale of the economic effect and the statistical 
significance of the findings is lower for other components of the risk rating. These 
findings are consistent both with the wider strategic importance of the I&E surplus 
which has significance and meaning to a stakeholder audience which extends far 
beyond the immediate concerns of the regulator, and with the evidence that the I&E 
surplus represents a tighter constraint than other components. This finding also raises 
the possibility of cognitive bias in the form of ‘anchoring’ (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) around a long-standing performance measure of wider stakeholder significance 
for accruals management and/or regulatory design. The design of the financial risk 
rating inevitably involves assumptions about a typical ‘business model’ for Foundation 
Trusts. However, whilst there has been a long history of familiarity with the I&E 
surplus within the National Health Service, there has been less visibility and focus on 
for example EBITDA and ROA. The possibility of ‘anchoring’ around the I&E measure 
and financial break-even warrants further research.  
Internationally, our findings have relevance where public and not-for –profit 
healthcare systems adopt performance measurement which involves financial 
monitoring either by external agencies or internally as an instrument of management 
control.  In the US, for example, there are numerous hospital systems such as Kaiser 
Permanente which operates 37 hospitals in California. Elsewhere, such as in Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, multi-dimensional balanced scorecard systems, which 
variously draw on World Health Organisation’s PATH system (WHO 2007), have been 
adopted to compare and monitor hospital performance. This suggests the possibility of 
further research in alternative settings, (including the possibility of comparative studies 
both internationally and across the not-for-profit, for-profit and public sectors), into the 
impact of monitoring, both internal and external, on financial reporting quality. 
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Our findings have some practice and policy implications. Whilst accruals 
management around regulatory targets is unlikely to be eliminated further investment 
in cost effective measures to improve financial reporting quality would enhance 
regulatory effectiveness and facilitate more effective allocation of resources across the 
healthcare sector: intervention would be more timely when underlying performance is 
poor and there would be less scope for Trusts to disguise their potential for service 
development when underlying performance is strong.  Such measures might include 
additional audit guidance, a review of audit materiality thresholds, and more refined 
regulatory monitoring of accruals. In a more marketised NHS other measures might 
also include a strengthening of the incentives to report good financial performance 
which, subject to wider political considerations, would mitigate the incentives to 
disguise surpluses. These considerations are particularly relevant when, as at 
present, there are considerable pressures on public spending and the funding of the 
health service. 
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8 Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable No. obs. Mean Std.Devn. Min. Max. Median Skewness Kurtosis
Total income £000 332 266,671 180,351 21,024 1,168,963 222,987 2.120 8.546
Total assets £000 332 201,568 158,158 9,885 1,135,903 155,625 2.777 13.737
Staff costs £000 332 166,415 99,594 10,488 650,127 146,322 1.812 7.554
EBITDA £000 332 17,013 15,877 -19,749 106,505 13,364 2.286 10.409
EBITDA/TI % 332 6.096 2.907 -9.504 17.545 5.972 -1.007 8.612
I&E surplus 332 4,374 10,080 -45,772 93,574 3,300 2.918 32.039
I&E surplus/TI % 332 1.557 3.521 -22.027 25.254 1.409 -0.542 19.733
Liquidity days 332 28.907 26.276 -32.669 200.311 26.315 1.266 8.516
Return on assets 332 3.394 6.421 -31.851 41.727 4.210 -0.640 11.785
Net current assets £000 332 11,230 14,908 -23,913 91,183 8,018 1.278 6.060
Receivables £000 332 11,363 10,693 1,349 68,546 8,174 2.795 12.107
Inventory £000 332 3,104 3,572 0 19,132 2,316 1.941 7.311
Payables £000 332 25,086 19,881 2,031 147,757 19,037 2.608 12.298
Depreciation £000 332 7,441 6,211 429 42,535 5,674 2.475 11.304
Long term provisions £000 332 1,811 2,326 0 20,368 1,030 3.613 23.501
Bad debt expense 332 311 990 -4,426 9,637 107 3.660 35.346
 
 
Page 35 of 46 
 
Table 2 
Pairwise correlation statistics: pre-managed component risk ratings 
 
Indicators EBITDA rating I&E rating ROA rating Liquidity rating PBL indicator
EBITDA rating 1.00
(1-5)
I&E rating 0.64 1.00
(1-5) (0.00)
ROA rating 0.52 0.73 1.00
(1-5) (0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity rating 0.26 0.43 0.32 1.00
(1-5) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PBL indicator -0.37 -0.75 -0.60 -0.41 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
p-values in parentheses 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals 
 
Weighted Rating N mean T-test sd min max median skewness
(Pre-managed) mean=0
1 35 0.008 0.160 0.052 -0.097 0.153 0.004 0.700
2 113 0.011 0.000 0.025 -0.055 0.124 0.010 1.404
3 125 -0.003 0.145 0.019 -0.082 0.049 -0.002 -0.533
4 or 5 59 -0.016 0.002 0.037 -0.140 0.126 -0.017 0.068
Total 332 0.001 0.759 0.031 -0.140 0.153 0.000 0.530
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Table 4 
 Estimation results for discretionary accruals and pre-managed risk rating 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed surplus -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.100*** -0.0801***
(0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0388) (0.0326) (0.0258)
Pre-managed risk rating 1 0.00687 0.0134
(0.00827) (0.00877)
Pre-managed risk rating 2 0.0107*** 0.0110***
Rating (0.00332) (0.00319)
Pre-managed risk rating 3 -0.00491
(0.00296)
Pre-managed risk rating >=4 -0.0182*** -0.0139**
(0.00632) (0.00599)
Type Acute Specialist 0.0151** 0.0168** 0.0142** 0.0216*** 0.0232***
(0.00625) (0.00667) (0.00625) (0.00779) (0.00764)
Acute Teaching -0.000960 -0.00221 -0.00126 -0.00217 -0.00151
(0.00523) (0.00512) (0.00524) (0.00518) (0.00478)
Ambulance -0.0772*** -0.0758*** -0.0808*** -0.0618*** -0.0625***
(0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0216)
Mental Health 0.0180*** 0.0172*** 0.0174*** 0.0188*** 0.0186***
(0.00452) (0.00444) (0.00449) (0.00481) (0.00470)
Region Midlands 0.00122 0.00216 0.00179 0.00176 0.00288
(0.00583) (0.00582) (0.00580) (0.00598) (0.00611)
North 0.00542 0.00565 0.00594 0.00479 0.00645
(0.00542) (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00549) (0.00544)
South 0.00704 0.00863 0.00844 0.00569 0.00750
(0.00581) (0.00567) (0.00563) (0.00607) (0.00612)
DA it-1 Prior year discretionary accruals -0.0376 -0.0689 -0.0529 -0.0401 -0.0366
(0.0914) (0.0970) (0.0975) (0.0933) (0.0857)
RepSurp it-1 Prior year reported performance 0.0780*** 0.0747*** 0.0755*** 0.0801*** 0.0877***
(0.0267) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0286)
TI it-1 Log of prior year total income 3.04e-08** 2.73e-08** 3.00e-08** 2.69e-08* 2.74e-08**
(1.44e-08) (1.35e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.40e-08) (1.34e-08)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0201*** -0.0229*** -0.0177** -0.0162** -0.0239***
(0.00754) (0.00764) (0.00772) (0.00779) (0.00755)
Observations 332 332 332 332 332
R-squared 0.212 0.231 0.214 0.237 0.259
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Base 
group: 
acute
Base 
group: 
London
 
Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
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Table 5 
Estimation results for discretionary accruals and the prudential borrowing limit and pre-
managed component risk ratings of 2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed surplus -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.0971***
(0.0400) (0.0366) (0.0384) (0.0403) (0.0319)
Rating EBITDA % 0.00627*
(0.00342)
I&Esurplus% 0.0129***
(0.00304)
ROA% 0.00639*
(0.00343)
Liquidity (days) -0.00111
(0.00735)
Prudential borrowing limit 0.0155***
(0.00390)
Type Acute Specialist 0.0159** 0.0184*** 0.0147** 0.0146** 0.0215***
(0.00647) (0.00672) (0.00658) (0.00642) (0.00733)
Acute Teaching -0.00203 -0.00249 -0.000114 -0.00155 -0.00179
(0.00532) (0.00501) (0.00535) (0.00541) (0.00526)
Ambulance -0.0763*** -0.0724*** -0.0766*** -0.0778*** -0.0697***
(0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0208)
Mental Health 0.0165*** 0.0198*** 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0192***
(0.00463) (0.00457) (0.00456) (0.00449) (0.00459)
Region Midlands 0.00128 0.00391 0.00148 0.00108 0.00198
(0.00585) (0.00560) (0.00564) (0.00589) (0.00623)
North 0.00477 0.00700 0.00501 0.00487 0.00498
(0.00547) (0.00510) (0.00519) (0.00554) (0.00563)
South 0.00732 0.00820 0.00727 0.00703 0.00716
(0.00584) (0.00560) (0.00556) (0.00584) (0.00620)
DA it-1 Prior yr discretionary accs -0.0504 -0.0632 -0.0557 -0.0508 -0.0489
(0.0982) (0.0981) (0.0981) (0.0982) (0.0965)
RepSurp it-1 Prior yr reported performance 0.0723*** 0.0750*** 0.0753*** 0.0734*** 0.0834***
(0.0265) (0.0280) (0.0268) (0.0257) (0.0271)
TI it-1 Prior yr total income 3.29e-08** 3.30e-08** 2.57e-08* 2.96e-08** 2.84e-08**
(1.47e-08) (1.34e-08) (1.38e-08) (1.46e-08) (1.30e-08)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0205** -0.0264*** -0.0193** -0.0186** -0.0302***
(0.00797) (0.00754) (0.00755) (0.00780) (0.00819)
Observations 332 332 332 332 332
R-squared 0.215 0.239 0.216 0.209 0.250
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 if Pre-
managed  
component 
rating =2 or 
if prudential 
borrowing 
limit is 
breached
Base group: 
Acute
Base group: 
London
 
 
Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
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Table 6 
Discretionary accruals when component ratings are just below a risk rating of 3 and the I/E surplus is 
just below breakeven. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DA DA DA DA
Pre-mSurp Pre-Managed Surplus(AFP) -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.119***
(0.0399) (0.0387) (0.0399) (0.0403)
EBITDA, 1% below rating 3 0.00221
(0.00392)
I&E surplus, 0.5% below rating 3 0.0111***
(0.00295)
I&E surplus, 0.5% below breakeven 0.0111***
(0.00361)
ROA, 0.5% below rating 3 0.00282
(0.00565)
Liquidity, 2.5 days below rating 3 -0.00111
(0.00735)
Acute Specialist 0.0148** 0.0163** 0.0147** 0.0146**
(0.00644) (0.00660) (0.00640) (0.00642)
Acute Teaching -0.00166 -0.00216 -0.00140 -0.00155
(0.00540) (0.00546) (0.00541) (0.00541)
Ambulance -0.0775*** -0.0754*** -0.0776*** -0.0778***
(0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0204)
Mental Health 0.0175*** 0.0189*** 0.0177*** 0.0177***
(0.00462) (0.00455) (0.00453) (0.00449)
Midlands 0.001000 0.00292 0.00109 0.00108
(0.00582) (0.00577) (0.00585) (0.00589)
North 0.00472 0.00585 0.00475 0.00487
(0.00547) (0.00523) (0.00540) (0.00554)
South 0.00697 0.00775 0.00693 0.00703
(0.00569) (0.00564) (0.00580) (0.00584)
DA it-1 Prior yr discretionary accruals -0.0503 -0.0573 -0.0511 -0.0508
(0.0979) (0.0964) (0.0980) (0.0982)
RepSurp it-1 Prior yr reported surplus 0.0737*** 0.0751*** 0.0741*** 0.0734***
(0.0262) (0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0257)
TI it-1 Log of prior yr total income 2.99e-08** 2.94e-08** 2.91e-08** 2.96e-08**
(1.45e-08) (1.39e-08) (1.44e-08) (1.46e-08)
Year Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0189** -0.0223*** -0.0186** -0.0186**
(0.00776) (0.00761) (0.00774) (0.00780)
Observations 332 332 332 332
R-squared 0.210 0.225 0.209 0.209
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Comp  
Individual 
component 
metrics
Type          
Base group: 
acute
Region         
Base group: 
London
 
Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals  
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Table 7 
 
Comparison of I&E surplus margin before and after discretionary accruals  
 
<0 0-1 >=1
<0 34 40 31 105
0-1 16 41 43 100
>=1 8 36 269 313
58 117 343 518
I&E Surplus %
Reported
Total
Before discretionary accruals
Total  
 
 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 156.1, p = 0.000. 
Note: An I&E surplus margin of less 1% is associated with a component risk rating of 2 
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Table 8 
 Estimation results for discretionary accruals and pre-managed performance: additional test 
of inference that accruals management is in response to the incentive to avoid 
regulatory intervention† 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DA DA DA DA
Pre-mSurp Pre-Managed Surplus -0.119*** -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.119***
(0.0407) (0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0403)
EBITDA, 1% above rating 3 -0.00105
(0.00257)
EBITDA, 1% below rating 2 -0.00234
(0.0358)
Reporting surplus, 0.5% above rating 3 -0.00253
(0.00399)
Reporting surplus, 0.5% below rating 2 0.0323*
(0.0183)
ROA, 0.5% above rating 3 0.000156
(0.00625)
ROA, 0.5% below rating 2 -0.00118
(0.00574)
Liquidity, 2.5 days above rating 3 0.00846*
(0.00456)
Liquidity, 2.5 days below rating 2 -0.00464
(0.00915)
DA it-1 Prior yr discretionary accruals -0.0510 -0.0488 -0.0504 -0.0521
(0.100) (0.0995) (0.0981) (0.0980)
RepSurp it-1 Prior yr reported surplus 0.0743*** 0.0757*** 0.0738*** 0.0724***
(0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0261) (0.0255)
TI it-1 Prior yr  total income 2.91e-08** 3.17e-08** 2.93e-08** 2.79e-08*
(1.44e-08) (1.50e-08) (1.44e-08) (1.44e-08)
Controls Year, type, region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.0183** -0.0195** -0.0187** -0.0193**
(0.00783) (0.00825) (0.00761) (0.00773)
Observations 332 332 332 332
R-squared 0.209 0.221 0.209 0.215
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
Comp             
Individual 
components 
of the risk 
rating
Dependent variable: DAit  Discretionary accruals 
 
†Explanatory note: If the additional accruals management for a pre-managed component rating of 2 is driven by 
intervention avoidance then we would not expect to see significance on the coefficient (in equation 3on 
Comp when the pre-managed component rating is just above 3 (as there would be no threat of intervention in 
this case) or when the component rating is just below 2 (as additional accruals management is unlikely to take 
the Trust out of intervention measures).   
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9 Figures 
Figure 1 
 The component metrics of the financial risk rating for Foundation Trusts 
 
(Source: (Adapted from) Monitor, 2009b. p.14.) 
All terms and definitions are taken from the regulator’s compliance framework. 
1 This is broadly equivalent to a return on capital measure. It is calculated as the income and expenditure surplus 
(after deduction of finance costs but before the dividend on public dividend capital) divided by taxpayers’ 
equity plus debt (including Private Finance Initiative balances and finance leases). The public dividend is a 
fixed charge of 3.5% on taxpayers’ equity and thus essentially resembles a cost of capital charge rather more 
than a dividend. 
2  The liquidity ratio is defined as cash plus trade debtors (including accrued income) minus (trade creditors plus 
accruals) plus unused committed or available working capital facility expressed as a number of days of 
operating expenses (excluding depreciation). Note: this ratio is referred to as a ‘liquidity’ ratio by the regulator 
but has features consistent with a cash conversion cycle. 
 
(Note the commercialization of the terminology applied to Foundation Trusts in the reference to EBITDA even 
though Foundation Trusts do not generate ‘earnings’ as such). 
 
The final ‘financial risk rating’ is the weighted average of the metric scores as illustrated below: 
Derivation of a Foundation Trust ‘financial risk rating’: An illustration 
Example: Trust X  has an I&E surplus margin of 0.8%, an ROA of 3.5% EBITDA margin of 6.2%,
 liquidity of 28 days of operating expenses, and achievement of plan of 83%. 
Metric Actual 
performance 
Component risk 
rating 
Weighting Weighted 
component 
risk rating 
I&E surplus margin 0.8% 2 20% 0.40 
Return on assets 3.5% 3 20% 0.60 
EBITDA margin 6.2% 3 25% 0.75 
Liquidity  28days 4 25% 1.00 
Achievement of plan % 83% 3 10% 0.30 
Weighted rating 3.05 
FINAL RISK RATING 3 
 
 
Measure Metric to be scored Weight % Risk Rating 
   1 2 3 4 5 
Financial 
efficiency 
I&E surplus margin % 20 <-2 -2 1 2 3 
Return on assets excluding dividend1 % 20 <-2 -2 3 5 6 
Underlying 
performance 
EBITDA margin % 25 <1 1 5 9 11 
Liquidity Liquidity ratio (days)2 25 <10 10 15 25 60 
Achievement of 
plan 
EBITDA% of plan 10 <50 50 70 85 100 
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Figure 2 
Prudential borrowing limit – the determining ratios 
 
Ratio Required level of 
performance 
Dividend cover >1 
Interest cover >3 
Debt service cover 2 
Debt service to revenue <2.5% 
 
Definitions: 
Dividend cover: (Revenue Available for Debt Service minus Annual Interest) divided by Annual PDC Dividend  
Interest cover: Revenue Available for Debt Service divided by Annual Interest 
Debt service cover: Revenue Available for Debt Service divided by Annual Debt Service 
Debt service to revenue: Annual Debt Service divided by Revenue 
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Figure 3 
Risk rating metrics - definitions 
(sourced from the Regulator’s compliance framework documents21) 
Financial 
Criteria 
Compliance 
Framework 
Definition 
Actual Calculation for years: 
2009/10 and 
2010/11 
2011/12  2012/13 and 
2013/14 
Financial 
efficiency 
Return on Assets 
excluding 
dividend (%) or 
Net Return after 
Financing (%) 
(Adjusted I&E 
Surplus/(Deficit)2 
+ PDC Dividend9 
Expense) divided 
by Total Assets 
Employed3 
EBIT5 divided by 
Capital 
Employed6 
Earnings after 
Financing7 
divided by Capital 
Employed8 
I&E Surplus 
Margin net of 
Dividend (%) 
Adjusted I&E 
Surplus/(Deficit) 
divided by 
Operating 
Income/Revenue 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Underlying 
performance 
EBITDA margin 
(%) 
EBITDA divided 
by Operating 
Income/Revenue 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Achievement of 
plan 
EBITDA 
achieved (% of 
plan) 
Actual EBITDA1 
margin divided by 
planned EBITDA 
margin 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Liquidity ‘Liquidity ratio’ 
[expressed as a 
cash conversioin 
cycle] (days) 
Net Liquid 
Resources4 
divided by 
Operating 
Expenses *365 
Same as previous 
periods 
Same as previous 
periods 
Notes: 
1 EBITDA is defined as: Total Operating Income – Total Operating Expenses (excl. Finance Costs, Depreciation, Amortisation 
and Exceptional Items).  
2 Adjusted I&E Surplus/(Deficit) is defined as: Net I&E Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax add back Exceptional Income/Costs & 
Impairments.  
3 Total Assets Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Net Assets + Borrowings).  
4 Net Liquid Resources is defined as: Current Assets (excl. Inventories, Derivative Related Assets, Available/Held for Sale 
Assets and Charitable Funds Assets) – Current Liabilities (excl. Charitable Funds Liabilities) + any unused Committed10 
Working Capital Facilities. 
5 EBIT is defined as: EBITDA, as noted above, less Depreciation & Amortisation.  
6 Capital Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Total Assets – Current Liabilities). 
7 Earnings after Financing is defined as: EBITDA – Tax – Net Finance Expense (incl. PDC dividend, PFI11 financing and other 
financial lease costs).  
8 Capital Employed is defined as: Period Average of (Taxpayers’ Equity + Lease Liabilities + Borrowing). 
9 PDC: Public Dividend Capital represents the Department of Health’s long term investment in each Trust that, although 
repayable, does not have a defined repayable schedule. It was initially provided to NHS Trusts when they were first formed 
to enable them to purchase the Trust’s assets from the Secretary of State. It appears in the Trust’s ‘taxpayer’s equity’ section 
of their Statement of Financial Position and is similar in status to share capital in a company. The PDC dividend however  
is not a charge related to the value of Public Dividend Capital (PDC) alone. It is paid at a rater of  3.5% of the average net 
relevant assets of a trust. Net relevant assets are broadly equivalent to Taxpayers equity but after the deduction of some 
specific reserves such as the donated asset reserve. (NHS Trust Development Authority 2016, Annex 7, Appendix 6) 
10  Committed working capital: Foundation Trusts are required by the regulator to have working capital facilities in place 
with banks of about one month’s operational expenditure.  
11 PFI – Private finance initiative: a method of providing funds for major capital investments where private firms provide the 
capital investment for public projects, such as new hospital facilities, and then lease the project assets back to the relevant 
public body – in this case an NHS Foundation Trust.  
12 Taxpayers’ Equity: Public dividend capital plus reserves (e.g. the income and expenditure reserve) 
 
                                                 
21 Monitor, 2009b, p. 14,  2011 p. 23, 2013, p. 23. 
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Figure 4 
Predicted signs of coefficients on independent variables  
Independent 
variable 
Description  Hypothesis  Expected 
sign 
Pre-mSurp Pre-managed 
surplus 
 H1 
 
Discretionary accruals will be 
managed to report small surpluses 
-ve 
Rating  Pre-managed 
‘financial risk 
rating’ 
1 H2b No additional accruals management  
2 H2a Discretionary accruals will be 
additionally income increasing in 
order to avoid regulatory intervention 
+ve 
3 H2b No additional accruals management  
4 or 
5 
H2b No additional accruals management  
Comp =1 for breach of the 
pre-managed 
prudential 
borrowing limit 
H2a Discretionary accruals will be 
additionally income increasing in 
order to avoid regulatory intervention 
+ve 
=1 for small pre-
managed deficit 
H2c Discretionary accruals will be 
additionally income increasing  
+ve 
 
Dependent variable = discretionary accruals. 
 
The derivation of aTrust’s financial risk rating can be found in Figure 1. 
 
A risk rating of 2  triggers regulatory intervention in the form of additional reporting requirements but can escalate 
for a risk rating of 1 to more direct intervention and ultimately to removal of the Board and Governing Body. 
A risk rating of 3 is the default level of regulatory monitoring which involves the submission of quarterly financial 
returns. 
A risk rating of 4 or 5 generates rewards in the form of a lower frequency of reporting (bi-annually) and access to 
additional resources. 
 
 
 
